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Abstract
William Dembski (2002) claimed that the NFL-theorems from op-
timization theory render Darwinian biological evolution impossible.
H¨ aggstr¨ om (2006) argued that the NFL-theorems are not relevant for
biological evolution, since the assumptions of the NFL-theorems are
not met. Although I agree with H¨ aggstr¨ om (2006), in this article I
argue that the NFL-theorems should be interpreted as dealing with an
extreme case in a much broader context. This broader context is in
fact relevant for scientiﬁc research of evolutionary processes; not in the
sense that the models can be used to draw any conclusion about the
real biological evolution (and certainly not about any design inference),
but in the sense that it allows us to interpret computer simulations of
evolutionary processes. As a result of this discussion, I will argue that
we learn very little, if anything at all, about biological evolution from
simulations. This position is in stark contrast with certain claims in
the literature that I will discuss.
Keywords and phrases: evolution, mathematical model, no free lunch
theorems, simulation.
1 Introduction
The No Free Lunch Theorems (NFL-theorems) were introduced in the bi-
ological ﬁeld by William Dembski in his book No Free Lunch (2002), with
the goal to show that Darwinian evolution is incapable of producing cer-
tain complex structures. In his book (and elsewhere), Dembski then argues
that these complex structures must have been designed, thereby following
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1Michael Behe’s best-selling Darwin’s Black Box (1996). Dembski and Behe
are two major ﬁgures in the Intelligent Design (ID) movement; a movement
which claims that nature bears the unmistakable signs of intelligent design.
In this article, I will argue that the NFL-theorems do play a role in the
discussion about evolution, albeit a somewhat diﬀerent role than Dembski
envisioned. This does not imply that I defend ID in any way; I would like
to emphasise this from the outset. Indeed, I have critized Dembski’s design
inference in many other publications before, see e.g. Meester (2003).1 I cer-
tainly believe that we have been produced by some evolutionary process,
and this is precisely the reason that I am very much interested in scientiﬁc
research of biological evolutionary processes, especially when my own disci-
pline - mathematics and probability theory in particular - comes into play.
And mathematics comes into play very much as soon as we make models of
evolutionary processes and even more so when we simulate such processes
on a computer. Simulating evolution is a genuine branch of research, with
research papers doing only simulations making it to Nature; see for instance
Lenski et. al (2003) for a typical example to which I will return later in this
article.
The (very reasonable) objections against any inference of intelligent de-
sign have been so strong and emotional (see for instance Orr (2002) for a
typical reaction), that most people didn’t really take the trouble to think
deeper about certain claims. In this article then, I want to explain why
I think that the NFL-theorems give rise to interesting considerations con-
cerning the interpretation of scientiﬁc research in evolutionary processes,
without - of course - defending or making any design claim.
The article is built up as follows. First, I want to explain what the NFL-
theorems say, and how this can be connected to evolutionary processes. I will
illustrate the NFL-theorems with some toy-examples, to make the reader a
bit more familiar with their use, and also to illustrate my point later on. I
brieﬂy sketch the reasoning of Dembski (2002) leading to his claim that these
NFL-theorems disprove Darwinian evolution. After that, I will summarise
some of the arguments of H¨ aggstr¨ om (2006), who convincingly showed that
the NFL-theorems themselves are not relevant for biological evolution at all.
However, I will put the NFL-theorems into a somewhat broader framework
which is relevant for evolution. I will then argue that this broader framework
still has very little to say about real evolution, but at the same time, it does
say something about simulations of evolutionary processes. Indeed, I will
argue that these simulations add very little - if anything at all - to our
1This publication is in Dutch.
2understanding of evolutionary processes. This is in stark contrast to claims
made by some authors (I will give some references later).
2 The NFL-theorems; theory and some examples
A certain modest amount of mathematical notation is unavoidable in this
section, but I will make the mathematics as light as possible.
Consider a ﬁnite set V and a function f : V → R (the set of real numbers)
which assigns a real number to each element in V . Suppose we want to ﬁnd
an element x ∈ V for which f(x) is maximal. This may seem like an easy
problem, but typically, V is extremely large, so a one by one search to ﬁnd
an x ∈ V with maximal value of f(x) would take much too long.2
Therefore, in optimization theory, one tries to set up some search algo-
rithm to ﬁnd an x ∈ V that perhaps does not really maximize f(x), but for
which f(x) is high in a certain sense; for instance, one often tries to ﬁnd
an x which satisﬁes f(x) ≥ t, for some given t. (See for instance Aarts and
Lenstra (1997) for much more information on algorithmic search.)
In our context, such algorithms have the following general form. Let f be
a function as above (very often, f is referred to as a ﬁtness function and we
will adopt this terminology), and deﬁne a target set T ⊂ V , say a set of the
form T = {x ∈ V : f(x) ≥ t}. First we choose an element x1 ∈ V according
to some rule (not involving the function f but possibly involving additional
randomness) and we compute f(x1). Given some rule that can only take
into account x1 and f(x1) (and additional randomness), another point x2 is
chosen, diﬀerent from x1, and f(x2) is computed. After k steps, we have k
points x1,...,xk and in addition the values f(x1),...,f(xk). The algorithm
then goes on to choose a new point xk+1 which has not been selected before,
according to some rule that only involves x1,...,xk, f(x1),...,f(xk) and
possibly additional randomness. After that, f(xk+1) is computed, et cetera.
If we choose the next point xk uniformly at random among all points
that have not been chosen before, that is, in such a way that each of the
points not yet chosen have equal probability to be chosen, then we call the
resulting algorithm blind search, for obvious reasons. Often though, the rule
according to which one chooses the next xk uses some structure of the set
V . For instance, if V consists of pairs (k,l) for integers k and l, then one
could, for example, choose the next xk among neighbours of points already
chosen. Some examples follow soon.
2For instance, if V is the set of possible ways in we can line up, say, 150 objects, then
there is no way in the world that we can ever calculate f(x) for every x ∈ V .
3The stage is now set for the NFL-theorems (see Wolpert and Macready
1997).3 They state that in a certain average sense, no search algorithm can
be better than any other. In their (and our) setting, the functions f are
only allowed to take values in a ﬁnite set S. Since also V is ﬁnite, there
exist only ﬁnitely many functions f : V → S, and the NFL-theorems are
concerned with a certain average over all these functions. To formally state
the result, let Ek be the event that at least one of the points x1,...,xk falls
into the target set T. When we take T = {x ∈ V : f(x) ≥ t} this boils down
to the event that one of the recorded values f(x1),...,f(xk) has a value at
least t.
Theorem 1 (NFL-theorem) Let pA,f be the probability of the event Ek
when using the function f and search algorithm A. When we average these
numbers over all f, the outcome is independent of the search algorithm A.
The conclusion of the theorem seems quite surprising. It says that no
algorithm is better than any other at quickly ﬁnding a target set T. In
particular, no search algorithm is better than the blind search algorithm, in
which the next xk is simply chosen uniformly at random among all points
that have not been chosen before. Put in yet other words: we cannot expect
a search algorithm to be eﬃcient unless we restrict ourselves to functions f
that are distinguishable from the “average” f, and I believe that this last
formulation is a concise description of the importance of the NFL-theorems.
Surprising as the result may sound at ﬁrst sight, the NFL-theorem is
in fact almost a mathematical triviality once you see things from the right
angle. I do not intend to explain this here, and I refer to H¨ aggstr¨ om (2006)
for an excellent explanation as to why this is the case.
Before we continue, let me very brieﬂy sketch why Dembski thinks that
the NFL-theorem renders Darwinian evolution impossible. It is fairly com-
mon to view evolution as an algorithmic search procedure (see e.g. Dennett
(1995)), or as an optimization problem in which we want to maxime a ﬁtness
function f which assigns, for instance, a ﬁtness to each DNA sequence. The
search consists of changing the DNA sequence at certain locations, lead-
ing to a new element in the space of DNA sequences (our space V ). Since
the “target set” of DNA sequences which correspond to living organisms
is extremely small compared to the total number of DNA sequences, blind
search will essentially never ﬁnd it. Therefore, since according to the NFL-
theorem, no algorithm works better than blind search, Darwinian evolution
3The plural refers to the fact that there are many similar results; we will be concerned
with only one of them.
4is impossible, unless want “leads” to algorithm to the target set by using a
very special ﬁtness function or algorithm. This however would, according to
Dembski, be cheating since the search of such a special algorithm or ﬁtness
function would be at least as diﬃcult as the search for the target set itself in
the ﬁrst place. (Dembski coins this the displacement problem; see Dembski
(2002) Section 4.7.)
I do not disagree with H¨ aggstr¨ om concerning his criticism on this ar-
gument. Indeed, it is simply not the case that a biological ﬁtness function
can be viewed as an average over all possible ﬁtness functions. Indeed, had
this been the case, then a simple mathematical argument shows that the ﬁt-
nesses of two DNA sequences which diﬀer in only one position, would have
been completely independent of each other, and this is clearly not the case.4
Therefore the NFL-theorems simply do not apply.
This sounds as the end of the story, and if this were the case there was no
need to write the present paper. However, the story does not end here and
in order to make my point later, I will now ﬁrst discuss two simple examples
of the NFL-theorem in action.
Example 1. Let V consist of only 3 points a, b and c. Suppose in addition
that S consist of 2 points, say 0 and 1. Then there are only 8 diﬀerent
functions from V to S, which we can represent by the 8 triplets of 0’s and
1’s. We distinguish two diﬀerent search procedures A and B: A will be
blind search, that is, each next point will be chosen at random among the
remaining ones, whereas B searches in a ﬁxed order a, b and c. We are
interested in the probability that the search algorithm ﬁnds a point x ∈ V
with f(x) = 1 in at most two steps. For the algorithms A and B we denote
these probabilities by pA,f and pB,f resepctively. In the next table, we write
all 8 functions f, together with the values of pA,f and pB,f. For instance
on the second line, blind search will ﬁnd the point c with probability 2/3,
whereas under algorithm B, the only point (namely c) where f takes the
value 1, will not be found and hence the 0 in the last column. Note that
although pA,f and pB,f are sometimes diﬀerent for the same f, the average
value over all 8 functions is equal to 3/4 in both cases, in accordance with
the NFL-theorems.
4See H¨ aggstr¨ om (2006) for a full and detailed explanation of this claim.
5number f(a) f(b) f(c) pA,f pB,f
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 2/3 0
3 0 1 0 2/3 1
4 0 1 1 1 1
5 1 0 0 2/3 1
6 1 0 1 1 1
7 1 1 0 1 1
8 1 1 1 1 1
average 3/4 3/4
Table 1. The 8 functions, together with pA,f and pB,f.
Example 2. Let V consist of all sequences of letters of the alphabet of
length 3. Consider one such sequence, for instance the word YES, and
deﬁned a ﬁtness function f : V → R as follows: For any word αβγ ∈ V ,
f(αβγ) = 1 if only the ﬁrst letter matches with the word YES; f(αβγ) = 2 if
only the second letter matches; f(αβγ) = 4 if only the third letter matches.
Furthermore, if two or more letters match, we add the values of the matching
letters. So for instance, f(FEW) = 2, f(Y EW) = 3, f(RES) = 6 and
f(Y ES) = 7; the word YES maximizes this ﬁtness function. This ﬁtness
function is chosen in such a way that we can read oﬀ from its value not only
how many letters match with YES but also which ones. For instance, if we
have a word with ﬁtness 6, then we know that the second and last letter
match, and the ﬁrst letter does not.
Given this ﬁtness function, we can design a search algorithm that actu-
ally leads us to the word YES (which has maximal ﬁtness 7) rather quickly.
Indeed, if at some moment in time, we have a word with ﬁtness 5 say, then
we choose our next word by ﬁxing the ﬁrst and third letter (since these are
already correct), and choosing a new second letter at random among all re-
maining possibilities that have not been seen before. In not too many steps
we will end up with the word YES, having maximal ﬁtness. Note that this
algorithm uses the value if f at the current point, unlike the algorithms of
Example 1.
It is clear that there is nothing special about the word YES, and we can,
by choosing the appropriate ﬁtness function, direct a similar algorithm to
any desirable ﬁnal outcome. If you use the “wrong” ﬁtness function, that
is, not corresponding to the target word, then you may never end up at the
target. The NFL-theorem asserts that if you consider the collection of all
ﬁtness funtions with values in {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7} and average over all these
6functions, then the (average) probability to reach a target with ﬁtness 7,
say, does not depend on the precise algorithm we use.
3 How to interpret an (in)eﬃcient algorithm
Let us consider Example 1 again, and suppose that someone tries to locate
a point in V with ﬁtness 2 in at most two steps of a certain (unknown to
us) search algorithm. We know from the example that for any such search
algorithm, on average (averaged over all ﬁtness functions) the probability to
be succesful is 3/4. Now suppose someone repeats the search many times,
and as it turns out, he is succesful every time. What conclusion would we
draw? Well, ﬁrst of all, we would probably conclude that this person does
not choose his ﬁtness function uniformly at random at each search, since
had he5 done that, the succes probability would have been 3/4. So we know
that he chooses his ﬁtness functions diﬀerently, although we do not really
know how. He can choose the same function each time, or choose a diﬀerent
one each time but not according to a uniform distribution in which each
function has equal probability of being chosen. Let us for simplicity assume
that he uses the same ﬁtness function all the time, say the ﬁfth function
given by f(a) = 1 and f(b) = f(c) = 0.
However, given that he uses this ﬁtness function, there is still freedom
in the search algorithm that he uses. In this particular example, it would
be unwise to use B, since then the succes probability is only 2/3. No, if
the ﬁfth ﬁtness function is used, then the choice of the algorithm must be
tailored around this choice in order to get an eﬃcient algorithm. In the
present example, algorithm B must have been used in order to be succesful
every time. The point I want to make, then, is that it will typically be the
case that for a given (class of) ﬁtness function(s), diﬀerent algorithms will
behave very diﬀerently, and one has to make the “correct” choice in order
to get an eﬃcient algorithm.
A similar reasoning applies to Example 2. If we ﬁnd that a certain re-
searcher ﬁnds the word YES over and over again, then we conclude that
his algorithm is too eﬃcient to be the result of averaging over all ﬁtness
functions; it is not likely that he chooses his ﬁtness function uniformly at
random over all possibilities at the start of each new search. No, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that he uses the ﬁtness function corresponding to the
word YES, and that he uses the search algorithm associated to that word.
Again, note that the conclusion is two-fold: we know that he uses special
5I use “he” where I strictly speaking should use “he or she”.
7ﬁtness functions and we know that his search algorithm is tailored around
this choice in orde to get an eﬃcient algorithm.
These remarks sound like very obvious remarks, and in a way they are.
Once a search algorithm is more (or less, for that matter) eﬃcient than
what you expect from the NFL-theorems, it must be the case that you use a
special choice, or a special class, of ﬁtness functions. But at the same time,
you must use a careful choice of the search algorithm which must have been
tailored around your choice of (the class of) ﬁtness functions. The point is
that if you average over all ﬁtness function(s), then it doesn’t matter which
algorithm you take - this is precisely what the NFL-theorems say. But if
you choose your ﬁtness function diﬀerently, then it does matter a lot which
algorithm you choose, as is illustrated by the examples above.
There is another way to look at this, as follows. The NFL-theorems
deal with a situation in which we average over all ﬁtness functions. If we
average, then it does not matter at all which algorithm we use, that is what
the theorem says. As such, the theorem deals with an extreme situation:
averaging over all ﬁtness functions. The other extreme is that we ﬁx one
speciﬁc ﬁtness function. In that case, as we saw above, it matters a lot
which algorithm one uses: only very special algorithms will be eﬃcient in
that case. Between these two extremes, numerous possibilities exist: we
may for instance look at a certain class of ﬁtness functions. It is not to be
expected that one can write down interesting general mathematical theorems
for these “intermediate” cases. Nevertheless, it is very reasonable to say that
there is a certain tendency which makes the choice of the algorithm more
signiﬁcant when we reduce the possibilities for our ﬁtness function.
So this is the conclusion that is connected to the NFL-theorems (I em-
phasise that this conclusion is not part of the mathematical theorems itself):
when a certain algorithm is eﬃcient in combination with a (class of) ﬁtness
function(s), then the algorithm must have been chosen very carefully. Note
the similarity with what Dembski called the “displacement problem”, but
also note the diﬀerence between his an my conclusion. I do not draw my
conclusion from the one class of rigorous mathematical results in this con-
text (the NFL-theorems), but instead from a broader perspective in which
teh NFL-theorems deal with one end of the spectrum only.
4 Application to evolution
What do we learn about evolution from this discussion? As already antic-
ipated above, I do not think that we learn a lot about the real biological
8evolution. Apart from the problems that were noted by H¨ aggstr¨ om (2006),
the ideas in No Free Lunch suﬀer from a too optimistic belief in the use-
fulness of mathematical models in biology (see also Olofsson (2007) for a
similar conclusion), and this remains true in the context of the present ar-
ticle. The mathematical concepts that are used can of course be given a
biological meaning; we already mentioned this before: the space V can be
the space of DNA sequences (up to a certain length, say) and the ﬁtness
function f can be - perhaps - interpreted as a real ﬁtness function. But
what about the search algorithms? I do not think it is reasonable to sum-
marise the extremely complex biology (and chemistry, physiscs ...) that is
associated to the process, into a single search algorithm. There are no real-
istic models of evolution that render this approach reasonable, life is simply
too complicated. Computing probabilities in a model is one thing, but for
these computations to have any implication, the models had better be very
good and accurate, and it is obvious that the various models do not live
up to this requirement. In particular, it is quite meaningless to compute
the probability that certain aminoacids combine to produce a particular
molecule, if there is no reasonable mathematical model around.
In addition, in my discussion of the NFL-theorems and beyond, I distin-
guished between algorithm and ﬁtness function; these concepts exist more
or less independently of each other. In real life however, the process itself
and the space on which this process acts, do not exist independently of each
other. The evolutionary process itself generates DNA sequences which we
took as our space V before. This means that the evolutionary picture is not
nearly as simple and clear as suggested by Dembski, and I ﬁnd it hard to
imagine how the discussion in this article could apply directly to biology in
any meaningful way. Mathematics is much less useful in biology than in,
say, physics.
This having said, I now want to argue that the algorithmic NFL-way
of thinking about evolution is very meaningful when it concerns computer
simulations of evolutionary processes. Unlike real evolution, computer sim-
ulations ﬁt very well into the formal mathematical settting as discussed in
this article, and the discussion applies to them directly. I will argue now that
the arguments in this article show that simulations of evolutionary processes
only demonstrate good programming skills - not much more. In particular,
simulations add very little, if anything at all, to our understanding of “real”
evolutionary processes.
Why? Let me ﬁrst go back to Example 2 above. If we are confronted
with a scientist who claims to obtain the word YES over and over again,
then we can be sure that the algorithm he uses is the one corresponding to
9the word YES; it is the algorithm that was described in detail in Example
2. We can be sure that this scientist designed his algorithm as to obtain
the word YES. Indeed, given his special ﬁtness function, he tailored his
algorithm around this choice in order to get an eﬃcient algorithm.
This eﬀect, then, is eminently present in any computer simulation of
evolutionary processes. Indeed, the computer program evolves acording to
the rules dictated by the program, which has been designed by some pro-
grammer. It is hardly reasonable to say that when we simulate Example 2
on a computer, the process reached the ﬁnal outcome with highest ﬁtness by
itself. No, given the ﬁtness function, the computer programmer designed an
eﬃcient algorithm himself, completely consistent with our discussion above.
In this case, I expect no one to object to this conclusion. However, this
might change when we look at much more complicated ways of simulating
evolutionary processes.
In Lenski et. al (2003), a typical example, computer simulations are used
to explain the evolutionary origin of complex features. In their work, digital
organisms - computer programs that self-replicate, mutate and compete -
evolve, and Lenski et. al wondered whether the programs would eventually
evolve into programs that can perform certain logical operations. The ﬁt-
ness of a program very much depends on the operations it can handle, and
if at some point in time, a program can execute a given logical operation, it
is rewarded with an amount of “energy”, which in this model boils down to
a certain amount of processing time; this can be seen as the ﬁtness of the
organism. Lenski et. al noted that this complex system of interacting com-
ponents produced (digital) organisms that could execute complicated logical
operations that were built from simpler ones, and that the organisms with
the highest ﬁtness evolved via organisms with low or intermediate ﬁtness.
This made them draw the following conclusions:
These ﬁndings show how complex functions can originate by ran-
dom mutation and natural selection.6
and
In closing, digital organisms provide oppertunities to address
important issues in evolutionary biology. They are particularly
well suited to problems that are diﬃcult to study with organic
forms owing to incomplete information, insuﬃcient time and the
impracticality of experiments.7
6Lenski et. al (2003) page 139.
7Lenski et. al (2003) page 143.
10How reasonable are their conclusions? First of all, let me emphasise
that their article is a pleasure to read, and that I am very much impressed
by the way they set up the simulation. It is, from this point of view, an
impressive piece of work. But does their conclusion follow? The answer is
no. What they did is set up a space V of computer programs (their digital
organisms) and assign a certain ﬁtness to each such program. This they did
very carefully. Then they - again very carefully - designed an algorithm that
would search for programs with a high ﬁtness. Many program parameters
must be ﬁxed during this careful selection, and it should be clear that most
“version” of any such algorithm would not produce anything interesting at
all. In the language of the discussion in this article, they very carefully design
an algorithm that is able to ﬁnd a program with a high ﬁtness (meaning here
the ability to perform a certain complex logical operation); they tailored the
algorithm around their ﬁtness function. It is certainly not the case that
one can say that the algorithm found a program with a high ﬁtness “by
itself”, and no one will object when I say that the algorithm was carefully
designed. As such, I do not see much relevance for inference about the real
biological evolution. I agree with them that their digital organisms provide
oppertunities to set up a very complex and impressive evolutionary process
involving mutations, ﬁtness and selection. But they simply made it that
way, and there is no principal diﬀerence between the approach of Lenski et.
al and Example 2 above.
If one wants to argue that there need not be any design in nature, then
it is hardly convincing that one argues by showing how a well-designed algo-
rithm behaves as real life is supposed to do. The NFL-theorems themselves
shed little light on this matter, since they deal with a situation which is sim-
ply not met in neither real life nor in computer simulations. But recognising
the NFL-theorems as dealing with an extreme case within a much larger
class of situations, and using inductive reasoning, one has to conclude that
the algorithmic way of thinking about evolution renders computer simula-
tion of evolutionary processes interesting and occasionally very clever, but
about real biological evolution they say very little - if anything at all. This
does not mean that the work of e.g. Lenski et. al (2003) is not scientiﬁc: it
is, but their inductive extrapolation to real life is simply not allowed.
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